China's blocking rules, EU's 21st Russia sanctions package, Strait of Hormuz transit risks, and Sweden's shadow fleet crackdown.
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Please find
below some recent developments in the area of sanctions. We also refer to our
previous sanctions updates which can be found here.
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China
enforces blocking rules to counter western sanctions On 2nd
May 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued for the first time a prohibition
order under its Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application
of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures in response to the U.S. designation
of five Chinese refineries. The order provides that the relevant U.S. sanctions
on five designated Chinese refineries shall not be complied with.
The Rules
are part of several Chinese legal instruments whose purpose is to prevent
companies subject to Chinese jurisdiction from complying with e.g. EU and US
sanctions, notably China’s Anti Foreign Sanctions Law which China’s Supreme
Court on 24 June 2026 held is mandatorily applicable. Failure to respect these
blocking rules (i.e. compliance with the western sanctions concerned) may have
numerous consequences, including:
- Companies
and individuals may be placed on China’s malicious entities list
- Visa
and travelling restrictions
- Freezing
or seizure of assets
- Fines
- Restrictions
on business activities
- Private
right of action entitling a Chinese counterparty to sue for damages
Without a
doubt, China’s blocking rules place western companies between a rock and a hard
place. Companies are recommended to review contacts and ensure that they provide
as good protection as possible. In particular, contracts should cater for great
flexibility and include concrete mechanisms that help the parties to navigate
through a situation where sanctions regimes clash. |
EU
issues its 21st sanctions package against Russia
On 23rd
July 2026, the EU Council agreed on imposing further sanctions on Russia and
Belarus which may be summarised as follows:
- Designation of 48 individuals and 170
entities including 94 financial institutions. Notably, designated entities
are domiciled in Russia, Georgia, Panama, the UAE, the Marshall Islands,
Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus.
- Designation of 41 vessels
- Introduction of the possibility of a full
third-country ban for crypto-asset services
- Addition of 51 new entities to the list of
those subject to tighter export restrictions on dual-use goods and
technologies which include entities in China, including Hong Kong, India,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates
- Additional export and import prohibitions
primarily on metals and alloys
- Expanded designation criteria regarding
“shadow fleet” vessels to include other vessel providing support to
“shadow fleet” vessels
Companies
are recommended to review their due diligence procedures to ensure they are not
unknowingly involved in indirect trade with Russia, Belarus, or with sanctioned
entities. Notably, the Swedish paper Dagens Industri recently reported that the
amount of advanced (and sanctioned) Swedish technology ending up in Russia has
increased drastically and also noted that India is a major re-routing hub
for this purpose.
The risk for sanctions circumvention stretches beyond
transactions with (the increasing) number of companies in third countries that
formally have been subject to tighter export restrictions. The risk is
present in all transactions, even domestic ones. As previously reported Sanctions update 1/2026 Russia’s procurement networks start in Sweden.
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EU
imposes a temporary relief regarding sanctioned Chinese semiconductor
manufacturer
On 23 April
2026, the Chinese semiconductor manufacturer Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic
Technology Co., Ltd. was sanctioned by the EU. The reason for the sanctioning is that the company has been deemed contributing to Russia’s war against
Ukraine in providing a significant number of components to Russia’s drones and
ammunition. However, the designation caused great turmoil amongst EU companies
doing business with the company. As a result, on 15th June 2026 the
EU introduced the possibility to
apply for a license to continue transactions, for a limited period of time, which are
strictly necessary to terminate ongoing contracts or otherwise to enable a
transition towards other suppliers.
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EU Court
of Justice interprets “facilitate” in the context of sanctions circumvention
Under the
various EU sanctions regimes, circumvention of sanctions is illegal and doing
so constitutes a separate sanctions breach (see e.g. Article 12 of Council
Regulation 833/2014). In addition, facilitation of infringements of the
prohibition against circumvention of EU sanctions is in itself a ground for
being sanctioned (see for example Article 3(1)(h) of Council Regulation
269/2014). The EU Court of Justice recently had reason to revisit the
expression “facilitate” when issuing a judgement in Case T-492/24, which was an
appeal by Dimitry Beloglazov of his designation.
The reason
for the designation was that Mr Beloglazov had been engaged in a scheme in
Russia to buy Oleg Deripaska’s shareholding in a company which held 28.5
million frozen shares in another company and thereby remove Mr Deripaska from the
ownership in order to make it easier to sell the shares and circumvent the EU
asset freeze.
The Court held that “facilitate” must be
understood as the act of making easier the carrying out of an operation intended
to, or resulting in, the circumvention
of restrictive measures, by assisting or aiding in the carrying out of that
operation. The Court also stressed the broad meaning of “circumvention”, holding
that the mere existence of an activity, in respect of which there are objective
factors allowing it to be regarded as aimed at thwarting of the sanctions
concerned, is sufficient for it to be regarded as circumvention. The appeal was
dismissed.
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EU Court
of Justice clarifies conditions for freezing assets in irrevocable trusts
The
notion of “control” is crucial across EU sanctions regimes, as it delineates
the boundary for which assets of a listed entity are to be frozen. In two
parallel preliminary rulings upon requests from the administrative court in
Rome (Case C-483/23, Joined Cases C-428/24 and C-476/24), the EU Court of
Justice was asked to clarify whether assets placed in offshore irrevocable
trusts frozen by the Italian Ministry of Finance could be considered
“controlled” by a listed person or entity. The Court held that also
assets in irrevocable trusts must be frozen when a listed ultimate beneficiary of
the assets – regardless of whether they are trust functionaries
or not – can use or influence the trust’s
assets or influence the trustee. When the listed person or
entity can recall the trust, replace functionaries, or give binding
instructions to the trustee, the trust’s assets are normally “controlled”. The
Court deferred to the Italian court to rule on the merits, but noted several
circumstances of the two cases that could indicate control.
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Sanctions
and transit of the strait of Hormuz
Vessels
transiting the strait of Hormuz not only runs a significant risk of being
physically attacked, the transit also involves a sanctions risk. On 27th
May 2026, the US designated the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) which is
the entity involved in collecting toll for transiting the strait. As a result,
any vessel paying toll for transiting the strait will breach US sanctions.
Although
the EU has not designated the PGSA, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
(IRGCN), which reportedly is controlling PGSA, is designated. In addition, the
Hormozgan Provincial Command of the EU listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Navy, which screens vessels and determines which ones are allowed to transit, was
designated by the EU on 8th June. Hence, paying toll entails also a
risk under EU sanctions.
In
addition, on 24th July 2026, Lloyds Market Association (LMA)
published a new model insurance clause stating, inter alia, that the vessel’s
insurer is discharged from all obligations in respect of the vessel if a toll
payment for passing through the territorial waters of Iran, or otherwise to
transit the Strait of Hormuz, is made. The main reason for the clause is
reportedly to close a gap under the UK Insurance Act. However, it also serves a
purpose in a wider context to put down a marker that marine insurers
steadfastly oppose regimes which threaten safe passage of vessels. As the
explanatory notes to the clause make clear, payments
for transiting an international waterway are illegal under UNCLOS.
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Sweden
hands over seized shadow fleet vessel to Ukraine
On 6th
August, a quite remarkable legal saga came to an end when the Swedish Supreme
Court did not grant leave for appeal regarding the seizure of the vessel CAFFA.
The vessel was seized on 6th March 2026 by the Swedish Coast Guard within
Swedish territorial waters on the basis of suspected unseaworthiness.
The vessel’s flag did not meet legal requirements and as a result the vessel
was deemed stateless and could not benefit from the right of innocent passage provided
for under public international law.
The seizure
has been maintained by the Swedish authorities with reference to a criminal
investigation to the theft of grain from non-controlled territories of
Ukraine. It is suggested that the theft constitutes a war crime. The vessel’s
owners have been contesting the seizure throughout. As per the judgement of the
first instance which was confirmed by the appellate court, the vessel is now expected
to be handed over to the Ukrainian authorities for further investigations.
In total, during
2026 the Swedish Coast Guard has boarded five suspected shadow
fleet vessels, invoking grounds such as unseaworthiness, statelessness,
falsified documentation and environmental violations.
Shadow
fleet vessels are generally defined as substandard vessels used to circumvent
sanctions. For more information about the shadow fleet see our Sanctions Update
1/2026 and 3/2024.
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It is evident that sanctions continue to have a significant impact on both domestic and international trade. Never has business life been so impacted by world politics. In case of any questions how sanctions or other trade restrictions affect your business, please contact Anders Leissner or Martin Johansson. | | | | | | | | |
Expert International Trade
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The contents of this newsletter are only intended to be of a general nature. The contents does not purport to be complete and should not be regarded as legal advice in relation to any particular matter. Information regarding Vinge’s processing of personal data is described in our Privacy Policy.
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